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The Welfare Ground for Dispensing with Consent to Adoption: the Supreme 
Court Decides 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
Strathclyde Law School 
 
 
In a previous article on these pages (2008 SLT (News) 213), Professor Norrie drew 
attention to a major innovation from the previous law which is contained in s. 31 of 
the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007.  This section sets out the new 
grounds for dispensing with parental consent to adoption one of which, designed as 
a safety net when the other grounds cannot be shown to exist or do not apply, is that 
³WKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH FKLOG RWKHUZLVH UHTXLUHV WKH FRQVHQW WR EH GLVSHQVHG ZLWK´ (s. 
31(3)(d)).  The conclusion of the earlier article was that this ground might be 
overbroad, and risked falling foul of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in S v. L 2012 S.L.T. 961 and the purpose 
of this article is to analyse whether the decision in that case fully answers the 
concerns that Professor Norrie previously expressed. 
 
The Previous Law 
Prior to the coming into force of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, the 
most common (because the least precise) ground upon which parental agreement 
was dispensed with was that agreement was being unreasonably withheld (Adoption 
(Scotland) Act 1978, s. 16(2)(b)). To establish this ground, the welfare of the child 
was clearly relevant, but it was not determinative.  The very nature of the 
reasonableness test, here as elsewhere in the law, presupposed a range and variety 
of decisions that could be characterised as reasonable, and a withholding of consent 
might be reasonable even when giving consent was both reasonable and, from the 
FKLOG¶VZHOIDUHSHUVSHFWLYHGHVLUDEOH  ³,WLVSHUIHFWO\IHDVLEOH´VDLG/RUG0F&OXVNH\ 
in Central Regional Council v. M 1991 S.C.L.R. 300 at 302³WKDWWKHFRXUWZLOOUHDFK
its own view that it would be better that the adoption order should proceed but 
nonetheless arrive at the view that a reasonable parent was perfectly entitled to 
withhold his or her consent to the makLQJ RI VXFK DQ RUGHU´  7KH FKLOG¶V Zelfare 
alone was not enough to justify an adoption order being made against the wishes of 
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a parent.  As Lord Carswell put it in Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust 
v. H [2006] UKHL 36 at para. 69: ³7KHPHUHIDct that the proposed adoption would 
conduce to the welfare of the child is not of itself sufficient to establish 
XQUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRQWKHSDUWRIWKHSDUHQW´.  Lord President Emslie in AB v. C 1977 
S.C. 27 at p. 31 was to the same effect when he said, ³7he exact weight to be given 
to the child's welfare will vary according to circumstances, for the ultimate decision 
must be a balanced decision which can never be reached by considering only 
ZKHWKHUOLIHZLWKWKHSURSRVHGDGRSWHUVZRXOGEHDµEHWWHUEHW¶IRUWhe child than life 
ZLWKKLVRZQSDUHQW´ 
 
All of this was designed to ensure that a satisfactory, capable and reasonable parent 
was able to prevent their child being adopted against their wishes, even in 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQ ZKLFK WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH ZRXOG EH enhanced by being adopted, 
and this consisted well with the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
European Court of Human Rights DFFHSWVWKDW³FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIZKDW LV LQWKHEHVW
LQWHUHVWVRIWKHFKLOGLVDOZD\VRIFUXFLDOLPSRUWDQFH´Scott v. United Kingdom 2000 
Fam. L.R. 102 at para. 18-94) but article 8 of the European Convention requires that 
state intervention in family life ± of which adoption of children against parental 
wishes is, self-evidently, the most extreme form ± be justified by more than a mere 
identification of which of various options would be WKH ³EHWWHUEHW´ IRU WKHFKLOG  ,Q
Olsson v. Sweden (1988) 11 E.H.R.R. 259 at para. 72 the Court said WKDW³LW LVQRW
HQRXJKWKDWWKHFKLOGZRXOGEHEHWWHURIILISODFHGLQFDUH´,QYC v. United Kingdom, 
(2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 33 at para. 134 WKH &RXUW VDLG ³WKH IDFW WKDW D FKLOG FRXOG EH
placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing will not on its own 
justify a compulsory measure of removal from the care of the biological parents; 
WKHUH PXVW H[LVW RWKHU FLUFXPVWDQFHV SRLQWLQJ WR WKH µQHFHVVLW\¶ IRU VXFK DQ
interference ZLWK WKH SDUHQWV¶ ULJKW XQGHU DUWLFOH  WR HQMR\ D IDPLO\ OLIH ZLWK WKHLU
FKLOG´ (emphasis added).  Measures that totally deprive a birth parent of his or her 
family life with the child and are inconsistent with the aim of reuniting the family 
³VKRXOG RQO\ EH DSSOLHG LQ H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG FRXOGRQO\ EH MXVWLILHG LI
WKH\ ZHUH PRWLYDWHG E\ DQ RYHUULGLQJ UHTXLUHPHQW SHUWDLQLQJ WR WKH FKLOG¶V EHVW





Interpreting the 2007 Act 
As an Act of the Scottish Parliament, the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 
requires to be interpreted, where at all possible, consistently with the European 
Convention and with the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in my earlier 
article, fearing that the welfare ground for dispensing with parental consent was not 
ECHR-compliant, I attempted to minimise its scope for application by suggesting a 
possible interpretation that would limit it almost out of existence.  Neither adoption 
SUDFWLWLRQHUVVHH6FRWW³:HOIDUHDQGWKH1HZ*URXQGVIRU'LVSHQVLQJZLWK3DUHQWDO
&RQVHQWWR$GRSWLRQ$5HSO\´6/71HZVQRULQWKHHYHQWWKH&RXUWRI
Session (see S v. L 2011 SLT 1204) were remotely persuaded by this suggestion, 
nor even it would seem by the underlying concern that motivated it.  I suggested also 
that, if the application of the new ground was not to be limited, then the dangers it 
represented might be restricted E\ JLYLQJ ³ZHOIDUH´ DV LW DSSHDUHG LQ V G D
much stricter interpretation than it would receive in s. 14(3), which sets out the 
general rule that WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH is the court¶V SDUDPRXQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ZKHQ
making decisions under the 2007 Act.  Such a suggestion had already been rejected 
by the English Court of Appeal interpreting very similar (though not identical) 
language in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (Re P (A Child), [2008] EWCA (Civ) 
535), but when S v. L reached the Supreme Court (2012 SLT 961) a stricter 
interpretation was indeed adopted, allowing the challenge to the validity of s. 31(3)(d) 
of the 2007 Act to be rejected.  The lead judgment was given by Lord Reed. 
 
When does section 31(3)(d) apply? 
Lord Reed accepts that, unlike the equivalent English legislation, s. 31(3)(d) does not 
apply in every case in which the parent can be found and has capacity to give (or 
withhold) consent.  In a recent decision from the Outer House, M v. R 2012 CSOH 
186 Lord Glennie at para. 62 said this: ³6HFWLRQGRIWKH$FWOD\VGRZQD
sequential approach to the question of whether the requirement IRU WKH SDUHQW¶V
consent to the making of the adoption order should be dispensed with. Assuming 
that the parents are alive, can be found and are capable of giving consent, it requires 
ILUVWDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIZKDWPD\EHFDOOHGWKHµLQDELOLW\WHVW¶VHWRXWLQVHFWLRQ
The court has to make a judgment on the alleged inability of the parents satisfactorily 
to discharge their parental responsibilities or exercise their parental rights. Only if 
that test is not satisfied, or for some other reason neither of subsections (4) or (5) 
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DSSOLHVGRHV WKH µZHOIDUH WHVW¶ LQVHFWLRQG± viz, whether the welfare of the 
child requires the consent to be dispensed with ± FRPH LQWRSOD\´  Subsection (5) 
does not apply when no permanence order has been made which deprives the 
parent of parental responsibilities and parental rights, and subsection (4) does not 
apply when the parent cannot be shown to be incapable of carrying out parental 
responsibilities and parental rights, or at least it cannot be shown that that incapacity 
is likely to continue.  Now, Lord Reed (S v. L at para. 28) accepts that the grounds 
based on parental inability and the earlier removal by a permanence order of 
parental responsibilities and parental rights are likely to apply in many, if not most, 
cases where adoption is opposed by a parent, leaving only limited scope for the 
application of the welfare ground for dispensation in s. 31(3)(d).  But that limited 
scope is exactly where the danger lies.  Putting it at its simplest, the welfare ground 
applies only in the case of a parent who has parental responsibilities and parental 
rights, and who is either currently able satisfactorily to exercise these responsibilities 
and rights or is likely to (re)aquire that ability.  Any applicant who relies on s. 31(3)(d) 
is therefore asking the court to dispense with the consent not of the parent who is 
incapable of bringing up his or her child properly, but of the capable ± often the 
reasonable ± parent: the parent, that is, who had the power to prevent the adoption 
under the pre-2007 law.  Adopting a child against the wishes of a parent who cannot 
be shown to be incapable of bringing up his or her child properly will require a strong 
justification before it is consistent with article 8 of the European Convention.  Given 
that most parents are satisfactorily able to fulfil their parental responsibilities and 
parental rights towards their children it can hardly be said that this amounts to the 
³H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ HQYLVDJHG E\ WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW LQ Johansen v. 
Norway.  For this reason it becomes all the more important that, even although s. 
31(3)(d) is applicable, how it operates in practice is such as to avoid, indeed prohibit, 
WKH³EHWWHUEHW´DSSURDFKHVFKHZHGXQGHUWKHROGODZUHMHFWHGDVLOOHgitimate by the 
European Court, and inherent in s. 14 of the 2007 Act. 
 
/RUG5HHG¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³ZHOIDUHUHTXLUHV´ in s. 31 
The thruVW RI /RUG 5HHG¶V MXGJPHQW concerns not so much the circumstances in 
which s. 31(3)(d) will apply, but its actual meaning.  He holds the provision 
compatible with article 8 because the test is not simply one of welfare in the sense of 




with.  Lord Reed holds (at para. 32) that tKHZRUG³UHTXLUHV´DVDPDWWHURIRUGLQDU\
English and before colouring it with the demands of the European Convention, 
imports a high test meaning that something is not merely desirable or reasonable but 
that it is necessary.  He quotes Lady Hale in Re S-B (Children) (Care Proceedings: 
Standard of Proof) [2010] 1 AC 678 at para. 7) as saying: ³,WLVQRWHQRXJKWKDWWKH
social workers, the experts, or the court think that a child would be better off living 
with another family. That would be social engineering of a kind which is not permitted 
in a democratic society. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
UHTXLUHV WKDW WKHUH EH D µSUHVVLQJ VRFLDO QHHG¶ IRU LQWHUYHQWLRQ DQG WKDW WKH
LQWHUYHQWLRQ EH SURSRUWLRQDWH WR WKDW QHHG´  Lord Reed himself goes on, in the 
central passage of his judgment (para. 34, emphasis added):  
³,W IROORZV WKDW OHJLVODWLRQ DXWKRULVLQJ WKH VHYHULQJ RI IDPLO\ WLHV EHWZHHQ
parents and their children will not readily be construed as setting anything less 
than a test of necessity. Section 31(3)(d), in stipulating that the welfare of the 
FKLOGPXVWµUHTXLUH¶WKDWSDUHQWDOFRQVHQWEHGLVSHQVHGZLWKLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
such a test. There must, in other words, be an overriding requirement that the 
DGRSWLRQ SURFHHGV IRU WKH VDNH RI WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH ZKLFK UHPDLQV WKH
paramount consideration. The court must be satisfied that the interference 
with the rights of the parents is proportionate: in other words, that nothing less 
WKDQDGRSWLRQZLOOVXIILFH,IWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHFDQEHHTXDOO\ZHOOVHFXUHGE\
a less drastic intervention WKHQ LW FDQQRW EH VDLG WKDW WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH
µUHTXLUHV¶WKDWFRQVHQWWRDGRSWLRQVKRXOGEHGLVSHQVHGZLWK´ 
 
At first sight, the requirement to show that nothing less than adoption will suffice 
seems to confirm, indeed emphasise, that more than a mere better bet must be 
shown, but it leaves entirely open the question: suffice for what?  Sufficient to ensure 
the best outcome, or sufficient to avoid the worst outcome?  Sufficient to protect the 
child from harm, or sufficient to achieve some improvement iQ WKH FKLOG¶V FXUUHQW
position?  /RUG5HHG¶VDQVZHULV implicit in his very next sentence: that it could not 
EHVDLGWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHUHTXLUHVGLVSHQVDWLRQRIFRQVHQWLIWKDWZHOIDUHFRXOG
be ³equally well secured by a less drastic intervention´If the child is as well served 
by refusing the adoption (making, perhaps, a permanence order or a s. 11 order 
instead) as by granting adoption then, Lord Reed tells us, the dispensation cannot be 
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granted, which is fine, other than that it tells us nothing.  For even if a scenario 
existed LQ ZKLFK WKH RSWLRQV DYDLODEOH IRU WKH FKLOG¶V IXWXUH DUH VR ILQDOO\ EDODQFHG
that either an adoption order or another order will equally VHUYHWKHFKLOG¶VLQWHUHVWV, 
adoption would have to be refused in any case because of the rule in s. 28(2) which 
provides that ³WKHFRXUWPXVWQRWPDNHDQDGRSWLRQRUGHUXQOHVVLWFRQVLGHUVWKDWLW
ZRXOGEHEHWWHUIRUWKHFKLOGWKDWWKHRUGHUEHPDGHWKDQQRW´.  In fact, it is far more 
likely, and at the heart of the problem, that adoption might be shown to be the best 
option for the child because other options, though they may suffice to secure the 
FKLOG¶VZHOIDUH, will do so less rather than equally well.  It remains entirely unclear 
whether s. 31(3)(d) is satisfied in these circumstances. 
 
Lord Reed assumes that welfare will require dispensation of parental consent when 
adoption is best for the child, without the necessity of showing that lesser options are 
positively harmful, or (it may be) he regards such lesser options as harmful merely 
because they are second best.  If this is so, then the ³ZHOIDUHUHTXLUHV´test under s,. 
31 becomes the same as the welfare balance under s. 14, that is to say WKH³EHWWHU
EHW´.  The courts are, of course, perfectly used to balancing different options and 
identifying the best outcome: that is the nature of the welfare inquiry in the context, 
for example, of applications for s. 11 orders under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, 
where second-best loses even though it is harmless, satisfactory and, in itself, 
acceptable.  But s. 31 of the 2007 Act, because it authorises compulsory state 
intervention in family life, must require far more.  It is submitted that s. 31(3)(d) 
should be interpreted in such a way that it is not satisfied wKHUHWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH
would be served less well, but still satisfactorily, by a less drastic intervention than 
adoption.  When Lord Reed requires it to be shown that ³QRWKLQJOHVVWKDQDGRSWLRQ
ZLOOVXIILFH´, this should be interpreted to mean suffice to protect the child from actual 
harm and not merely from a second-best outcome.  Alternatives to adoption must be 
shown, in other words, to be unacceptable, rather than less good.  Otherwise we risk 
the social engineering that Lady Hale warned against ± a risk Lord Reed accepts, by 
his quoting of Lady Hale, is present. 
 
Particular cases 
There are two very different types of case in which it is crucial that the law is clear on 
the point: that of the non-resident father seeking to prevent a step-parent adoption, 
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and that of a recovering drug-addict seeking to prevent the conversion of a 
permanent placement of the child into an adoptive placement. 
 
A birth father seeking to prevent a step-parent adopting his child is perhaps the 
easier case.  It is not uncommon for the new husband of the mother with residence 
of a child to seek, by adoption, to convert his status from step-parent to adoptive 
parent; nor is it uncommon for the birth father, even when enjoying little continuing 
relationship with the child, to oppose adoption in these circumstances.  Under the 
pre- ODZ WKH ELUWK IDWKHU¶V FRQVHQW FRXOG EH GLVSHQVHG ZLWK LI KH ZHUH
withholding it unreasonably, but now (on the assumption that he is alive, capable of 
consenting and not incapable of fulfilling his parental responsibilities) the only basis 
IRUGLVSHQVLQJZLWKKLVFRQVHQWLVWKDWWKHFKLOG¶V³ZHOIDUHUHTXLUHV´LW7KHUHDUHRI
course other means of securing the position of the step-father, most obviously an 
order under s. 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 conferring parental 
responsibilities and parental rights; but what cannot be done, short of adoption, is the 
transference of parenthood itself from the genetic to the social father.  Even 
assuming, for the same of argument, that such a transference is in the better option 
for the child, it certainly does not follow that it is an overriding requirement if the 
FKLOG¶V SURSHUXSEULQJLQJ FDQ EH VHFXUHG E\ D V. 11 order.  It cannot be said that 
³QRWKLQJ OHVV WKDQ DGRSWLRQ ZLOO VXIILFH´ WR SURWHFW WKH FKLOG IURP positive harm, 
though it could well be said that nothing less than adoption will suffice to ensure the 
child gets the better of two options.  If the former is the test then step-parent 
adoptions become much more difficult than they were previously; if the latter is the 
test they become easier because the applicant no longer needs to show parental 
unreasonableness. 
  
Courts have of course proved themselves willing to be persuaded that the security 
and permanence inherent in an adoption order amount to a better option for the child 
than the impermanence and challengeability of a s. 11 order (though some courts do 
resist that temptation: see Re S (A Child) (Adoption Order or Special Guardianship 
Order), [2007] 1 F.L.R. 819) +RZHYHU /RUG 5HHG¶V MXGJPHQW in S v. L, properly 
interpreted, does not give D VWUDLJKW FKRLFH DGRSWLRQ PXVW EH ³UHTXLUHG´ DQG WKDW
ZRUGFDUULHV³WKHFRQQRWDWLRQRIDQLPSHUDWLYHZKDWLVGHPDQGHGUDWKHUWKDQZKDWLV
PHUHO\RSWLRQDORUUHDVRQDEOHRUGHVLUDEOH´ Re P (A Child), [2008] EWCA (Civ) 535 
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per Wall L.J. at para. 125, quoted with approval by Lord Reed at para. 35.  If, as I 
hope it does, this amounts to an enhanced welfare test which requires the 
unacceptability of all other options, rather than a simple welfare test which involves 
the identification of the better of two alternatives, then ZHOIDUH ZLOO ³UHTXLUH´
dispensation RIDELUWKIDWKHU¶VFRQVHQWunder section 31(3)(d) only when the court is 
satisfied that there exists an imperative that the adoption should proceed, so 
powerful that it justifies overriding the interests of the birth father, and that nothing 
less than adoption will protect the child from positive harm that can be shown to be a 
likely consequence of failing to transfer lifelong parenthood from the genetic to the 
social father.  There can be no connotation of an imperative in circumstances in 
which dismissal of the application for adoption would leave the child in a satisfactory 
or at least an acceptable position, even where the making of an adoption order 
would, all things considered, overall clearly be a better bet for the child.  Step-parent 
adoptions against the wishes of an unimpeachable birth father have been vulnerable 
ever since Gorgulu v. Germany [2004] 1 F.L.R. 894. 
 
The more difficult scenario is that (broadly) illustrated by S v. L itself.  A child is 
UHPRYHG IURP LWV PRWKHU¶V FDUH because her inability to fulfil her parental 
responsibilities unchallengeably poses a risk of significant harm to the child.  After 
some time while the child is being looked after by a local authority, staying with long-
term foster carers, the decision is made that the foster carers will seek to adopt the 
child; around the same time, however, the mother shows signs of recovering her 
capacity ± perhaps by escaping from drug addition or the like.  The better bet for the 
child may well be to remain where he or she is, rather than to be subjected to the 
uncertainties of rehabilitation with a recovering drug addict.  A simple application of 
the welfare test, as set out in s. 14(3) of the 2007 Act, achieves this result.  But the 
PRWKHU¶V FRQVHQW PXVW EH GLVSHQVHG ZLWK before the court turns to the question, 
governed by s. 14(3), whether or not to make the adoption order.  Section 31(4) will, 
ex hypothesi, not be applicable if the mother is likely to reacquire parental capacity 
(so making the scenario very different from that in, for example, Scott v. United 
Kingdom where there was no indication that the alcoholic mother would ever escape 





only one applicable.  Adoption is not in principle required to securH WKH FKLOG¶V
permanent placement with the foster carers: a permanence order, or even a s. 11 
order, can achieve that aim.  Nothing short of adoption will suffice, of course, to 
create a new life-long parent-child relationship, but to use that aim as the justification 
for doing so is circular.  It ought to be insufficient to show that the new parent-child 
UHODWLRQVKLSZRXOGVHFXUHWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH better than the old: that is not the test, 
for a mere balancing of options does not import the necessity required to satisfy the 
³Zelfare UHTXLUHV´ ground for dispensation.  It needs to be shown that it would be 
XQDFFHSWDEOH IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZ RI WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH not to proceed with 
DGRSWLRQ WKDW UHWDLQLQJ WKH UHFRYHULQJ GUXJ DGGLFW DV WKH FKLOG¶V PRWKHU would be 
harmful in some way ± EH\RQGVHFXULQJWKHFKLOG¶VSODFHPHQW throughout childhood, 
which can be done without lifelong adoption ± to the child.  For only then could it be 
VKRZQWKDWGLVSHQVDWLRQZLWKSDUHQWDOFRQVHQWZDVDQ³LPSHUDWLYH´That imperative 
was held to be established in M v. R (above) where the children were long settled 
with foster carers, due to the risk that if the adoption order were not made in favour 
of the foster carers the birth parents would introduce disruption and uncertainty into 
WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V OLYHV E\ VHHNLQJ WR KDYH WKHP UHWXUQHG WR WKHLU FDUH HYHQ DOWKRXJK
their chances of success would be nugatory.  That risk, of disruption and continued 
uncertainty, must be shown to be genuine and substantial, and not speculative or 
fanciful.  Far less must it be allowed to become the mantra of all applicants for an 
adoption order seeking to rely on s. 31(3)(d). 
 
The true role of section 31 
There is, in fact, a flaw at the very heart of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 
2007.  Unlike with any other state intervention in family life, this most drastic, most 
severe and most irreversible intervention has no conditions precedent laid down 
before the court can move on to the question of whether to make the order sought.  
This is to be compared with, for example, s. 84 of the 2007 Act which sets down the 
conditions IRU WKHPDNLQJRIDSHUPDQHQFHRUGHURUVVRURI WKH&KLOGUHQ¶V
Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 which sets down the conditions for the making of a 
child protection order, or s. 67 of the 2011 Act which sets out the grounds upon 
ZKLFKDFKLOGPD\EHUHIHUUHGWRDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ$OORIWKHVHSURYLVLRQVKDYHLQ
common that they must be satisfied before the court or hearing moves on to a 
consideration of the welfare test in the determination of whether to grant the order 
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sought: they are designed to establish that there is some pre-existing breakdown in 
the proper upbringing process or to indicate that the child is at risk in some way.  It is 
that pre-existing breakdown or risk WKDW MXVWLILHV WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ.  These 
provisions, in other words, provide the conditions precedent or, as they are often 
described in English law, the ³WKUHVKROGFULWHULD´for state action and they emphasise 
that (in their different conte[WVLWLVDYRLGLQJULVNWRWKHFKLOG¶VZHOOEHLQJUDWKHUWKDQD
GHVLUH IRU EHWWHUPHQW RI WKH FKLOG¶V VLWXDWLRQ WKDW LV WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU VWDWH
intervention in family life.  Only once these conditions precedent have been satisfied 
is the court justified in examinLQJ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH Whe 
various options that are available.  As such, they serve the role of the ³RWKHU
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´EH\RQGZHOIDUHUHTXLUHGE\WKHMXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUW
of Human Rights.   
 
But these ³RWKHUFLUFXPVWDQFHV´RUFRQGLWLRQVSUHFHGHQWDUHHQWLUHO\PLVVLQJ IURP
the adoption provisions in the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007.  Their 
absence is explained by the peculiar position that adoption holds within child law ± 
as a private law action designed to achieve public law aims.  Adoption is an order 
sought by private individuals and not the local authority, and as such it appears to 
have no need for conditions-precedent for state intervention: it is on a par with s. 11 
of the 1995 Act which similarly allows the court to move straight to the welfare 
balance without establishing any justification for state involvement in family life 
(beyond the fact that the parties have asked for it).  But the reality of adoption is, of 
course, very different and it is, in large measure, a public law process, the ultimate 
and most severe outcome of child protection proceedings instigated by the state.  As 
such, conditions-precedent are all the more essential to provide the state with its 
justification for intervention. 
 
This gap is filled, if only partly, by the grounds for dispensing with parental consent 
which, properly understood, serve the function of providing the justification for state 
intervention in family life ± ZKHHWKHULWEHWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VSDrents are dead, or cannot 
be found, or are unable satisfactorily to fulfil their parental responsibilities.  It is with 
this function very firmly in view, rather than the necessity to allow parents to 
participate in the process, that the welfare ground in s. 31(3)(d), no less than the 
others in s.31(3), must be interpreted.  Given this fundamental role of s. 31 the 
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decisions, relied upon heavily by Lord Reed, of both the European Court of Human 
Rights in YC v. United Kingdom and the Court of Appeal in Re P (A Child) (above) 
upholding the compatibility of the equivalent provisions in the English legislation with 
article 8 are not in point.  Both these cases required an interpretation of the English 
³welfare UHTXLUHV´ ground for dispensing with parental consent in circumstances in 
which conditions precedent had already been shown to be satisfied and there was 
no need, therefore, to interpret them in such a way as served that function.  Both 
cases involved dispensing with parental consent not to adoption, but to a placing 
order, which can only be made under s. 21 of the (English) Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 if the threshold criteria for making a care order set out in s. 31 of the 
Children Act 1989 have already been satisfied: that the child concerned is suffering, 
or is likely to suffer, significant harm, attributable to lack of parental care or to the 
FKLOG¶V EHLQJ EH\RQG SDUHQWDO FRQWURO  By satisfying these threshold criteria, the 
(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶VUHTXLUHPHQWfor ³RWKHUFLUFXPVWDQFHV´to be shown beyond a mere 
balance of welfare is satisfied and the domestic court may then go on to make a 
placement orderDSSO\LQJWKH´ZHOIDUHUHTXLUHV´WHVW to the question of dispensation 
on the basis that this is better for the child than any other available option.  In 
Scotland on the other handWKH³ZHOIDUHUHTXLUHV´WHVWis WKH³RWKHUFLUFXPVWDQFH´. 
 
These English cases would be analogous to an application in Scotland to dispense 
with parental consent to the making of a permanence order with authority to adopt: s. 
84 of the 2007 Act sets down the conditions precedent (the circumstances beyond 
the welfare balance ± SDUWLFXODUO\ WKDW WKHFKLOG¶V UHVLGHQFHZLWK WKHSDUHQW LVRU LV
likely to be seriously detrimental to the child) which, once satisfied, allows to court to 
go RQ WR FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH UHTXLUHV GLVSHQVDWLRQ RI SDUHQWDO
consent under s. 83(2)(d).  Here too, as in the English cases, the requirement for 
dispensation of parental consent does not provide the condition precedent that 
requires to be satisfied before turning to the balance of welfare: that function is 
served by s. 84. For this reason, the concerns about the breadth of the ground in s. 
31(3)(d) do not arise with the identically worded ground in s. 83(2)(d) of the 2007 Act 
under which parental consent to including authority to adopt in a permanence order 
may be dispensed with, because before addressing that question the threshold 




Of course, it might be argued that in the vast majority of adoption applications it will 
already have been shown in earlier proceedings that the child is at risk: children 
DGRSWHGDJDLQVW WKHLUSDUHQWV¶ZLVKHVare likely already to be subject to orders like 
permanence orders and compulsory supervision orders for which conditions 
precedent have already been satisfied.  However, even if this were true for all 
FKLOGUHQ EHLQJ DGRSWHG DJDLQVW WKHLU SDUHQWV¶ ZLVKHV which it is not, as the step-
parent scenario shows), the argument is not sufficient protection against ECHR 
challenge.  The requirement to satisfy other threshold criteria appears on the face of 
s. 52(1)(b) of the English legislation when placing orders are sought, but no such 
UHTXLUHPHQWWRVDWLVI\WKH³ULVN´FRQGLWLRQVLQRWKHUOHJLVODWLRQDSSHars in s. 31(3) of 
the 2007 Act and as such fails to satisfy the ECHR requirement for legal certainty. 
 
Conclusion 
/RUG5HHG¶VMXGJPHQWLQS v. L partially but does not fully assuage the concerns that 
I previously expressed in relation to s. 31(3)(d).  The ambiguities in his judgment, as 
described above, leave room for doubt which require as a matter of some urgency to 
be resolved.  The Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill provides the Scottish 
Parliament with an ideal opportunity to do so before it is required to act by the 
European Court of Human Rights.  A simple amendment is all that would be 
required: making s. 31(3)(d) applicable only when, in addition to welfare requiring 
dispensation, the condition-precedent for making a permanence order in s. 
84(5)(c)(ii) is also satisfied.  In that way, a parent who poses no risk to his or her 
child, who is reasonable, and who is capable to bringing up his or her child 
satisfactorily (if not ideally) will be able to maintain their parenthood, even if there is 
no question of the child being returned to their full-time care. 
